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Abstract
Do Brokers Misallocate Customer Trades?
Evidence from Futures Markets
JEL Classification number: G12, G13, G18
In the context of futures markets, we study whether brokers allocate more favorable trades
to their own accounts, and less favorable trades to their customers.  We find that, within a thirty
minute trading bracket, brokers on average buy at a lower price and sell at a higher price for their
own accounts relative to their customers.  We show evidence that brokers’ price advantage may be
compensation for providing liquidity to the market when brokers trade for their own accounts, but
no evidence that they are due to brokers’ superior information, or to greater effort by brokers when
trading for themselves.  Consistent with the idea that, in a competitive market for brokerage
services, brokers may pass on some of their profits to customers, we find that brokers who trade for
themselves also provide superior execution for their customers, relative to brokers who do not trade
for themselves. 
1     
1CFTC Enforcement Action 4023-97 (CFTC Docket No.  97-8).
     
2However, the GAO also stated that banning brokers’ trading would not solve the problem, since brokers who
do not trade personally can also commit abuses by working together.  Currently, brokers’ trading is banned in most
active US futures markets (also see footnote five on this issue).
     
3The Wall Street Journal, February 17 1995, page C1.
Do Brokers Misallocate Customer Trades?
Evidence From Futures Markets
When brokers trade for their own accounts, in addition to trading for customers, there is a
potential for trading abuse.  One such abuse is misallocation, whereby brokers reserve the best prices
for their own trades and allocate trades with inferior prices to their customers.  For example, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) recently charged a broker for "fraudulently
allocating trades among his personal account and his three customer accounts to his benefit and to
the detriment of his customers." The broker in question entered orders, but not account numbers, to
the trading floor.  When the orders were filled, they were allocated either to the broker’s account
number or his three customers’ accounts, depending on fill quality.1
The General Accounts Office (GAO, 1989a, 1989b) reported cases in futures markets where
customers received worse prices than existing best bids and offers, and commented that brokers’
trading facilitated such practices.2  The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), in 1995, fined
Goldman, Sachs & Co. $250,000 for "assigning to the firm trades at prices more favorable than
those assigned to institutional customers."  In one case, Goldman, after receiving customer orders
to buy shares at $20.50 each, bought shares at prices of $20.50 and $20.25 within a three minute
period.  NYSE argued that Goldman should have offered the customer shares it bought for $20.25,
instead of $20.50, which is the amount it actually charged customers.3 
Economists may not necessarily interpret some of the trade practices described above as
2     
4This trading practice had been pervasive across securities markets until 1991, when it was partially banned in
some futures markets. See Grossman (1989) for a detailed description of the practice of dual trading in the securities
markets in the United States and other countries.
     
5
 The law allows an exemption if the exchange adequately improves audit trails. Five exchanges have
requested exemptions.  So far, only the Comex Division (Comex) of the New York Mercantile Exchange and the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME) S&P 500 futures contract have received unconditional exemptions from the
dual trading ban.  Seven other CME contracts and 13 contracts at the Chicago Board of Trade have received a
conditional exemption allowing dual trading in low volume months only.  See CFTC press releases, May 7, 1997
and November 7, 1997. 
detrimental to customer welfare.  Instead, they may argue, the difference in prices received by
customers and brokers is an implicit bid-ask spread, required to compensate brokers for their market
making activities.  For example, in the Goldman case, traders may have searched and received a
better price than initially targeted by the customer.  Arguably, Goldman could have sold to
customers at a price of (say) $20.375, keeping a "spread" of $0.125 per share for itself.  Although
this price difference could technically constitute misallocation, customers may receive a service
worth $0.125 per share.
  Economists may also argue that, given a competitive market for brokerage services,
"discriminated" customers are likely to be compensated in some other form---through lower
commissions (as predicted, in the context of front running,  by Fishman and Longstaff (1992)), or
better quality executions.
In this paper, we address these issues by analyzing the behavior of floor traders in futures
markets who practice dual trading (i.e., trade for their personal accounts in addition to trading for
their customers in the same futures contract during the same day).4  The potential for trading abuses
has spurred regulatory scrutiny of dual trading, culminating in the Futures Trading Practices Act of
1992, which required the CFTC to establish rules banning dual trading in all active futures markets.5
3We construct a two period microstructure model to illustrate how brokers may misallocate
customer trades.  In the model, an informed customer and noise traders trade through a broker in
period one.  The broker trades in period two based on information derived from customer orders.
The possibility of misallocation exists because the prices in the two periods are different, providing
the broker an incentive to allocate more favorable trades to himself.  We show that the incentive to
misallocate trades is increasing in price volatility and market uncertainty, and decreasing in the size
of uninformed trades.  We further show that brokers’ legitimate trading profits per futures contract
decrease with a trade’s price impact, but their profits per contract from misallocation increase with
the price impact.  Finally, we show that dual trading brokers may provide larger price discounts than
non-trading brokers, given a competitive market for brokerage services.
To empirically test for the existence of misallocation, we use a detailed data set consisting
of all transactions by dual traders, both for their own and their customers’ accounts,  in the S&P 500
index futures and the Japanese yen futures pits for fifteen randomly selected days in 1987.  Table
1 provides an overview of our tests and results.  Our analysis shows that, for both contracts, brokers
receive better prices for their own trades than for their customers’ trades.  However, brokers’ price
advantage in both contracts may be compensation for liquidity services provided by brokers when
trading for their own accounts.  Further, for the S&P 500 futures, brokers appear to pass on a portion
of their price advantage by providing superior execution to their customers.
  Specifically, we find that, within a thirty minute trading bracket, dual traders in both contract
markets buy at a lower price and sell at a higher price, on average, when trading for their own
accounts than when trading for customers.  A possible explanation of the price differences is that
they reflect dual traders' compensation for providing market making services to their customers.
Kuserk and Locke (1993), Silber (1984) and Smidt (1985) provide evidence that locals (futures floor
4traders who trade exclusively for their own accounts) behave as if they are market makers.  By
extension, dual traders when trading for their own accounts may act primarily as market makers, as
argued by Grossman (1981).  Consistent with this idea, we find that, for both contracts, the mean
realized bid-ask spread for dual traders’ personal trades and locals’ trades are equal.
However, for the S&P 500 futures the median bid-ask spread is higher than that of locals’
on days when dual traders trade for customers.  Since the sign and magnitudes of the median bid-ask
spreads appear to be more economically meaningful than the mean spreads (for example, median
spreads are always positive whereas the mean spreads are sometimes negative in our sample), we
cannot rule out the possibility that the bid-ask spreads for dual traders’ personal trades are
"excessive" compared to those of competing market makers in the S&P 500 futures.
Next, we examine the possibility that brokers’ "excess" revenues on dual trading days are
legitimate trading revenues derived from customers’ information, as suggested by Fishman and
Longstaff (1992), Roell (1990), and Sarkar (1995).  Our model predicts a negative (positive) relation
between the market price impact and brokers’ per contract profits from information (misallocation).
We test the model’s prediction by regressing dual traders’ daily personal trading revenues per
contract on the average daily price impact, controlling for other liquidity-related factors such as asset
volatility and customer trading volume.  We find that brokers’ trading revenues are strongly and
positively related to the market price impact for both contracts.  Thus, it appears unlikely that dual
traders’ price advantage is attributable to information-based trading by dual traders.
As a further test, we examine whether brokers trade in the same direction as their customers,
which (our model predicts) may indicate that brokers’ customers are informed.  We find that, for
the S&P 500 futures, brokers trade in the opposite direction of their customers, suggesting that
brokers’ customers are uninformed.  In the Yen futures, we find no correlation between the direction
5     
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  The contradictory results may be due to the markets studied since Chang and Locke (1996) study financial
futures, while Fishman and Longstaff (1992) study  soybean oil futures.  We, too, find evidence for superior execution
skills of dual traders in the S&P 500 futures market, but not in the Yen futures market.
of brokers’ own trades and their customers’ trades.
We also examine whether dual traders receive superior prices because they try harder when
trading for their own accounts.  If dual brokers trade for themselves when the market is slack, then
they may have more time to search for "good" prices.  We find that dual traders’ personal trading
activities are positively correlated with market activities for the S&P 500 futures, and uncorrelated
with market activities for the Yen futures.  So, dual traders do not appear to engage in personal
trading during times of market slack.
Finally, we investigate whether dual traders may pass on some of their trading profits to
customers through lower commissions or superior execution.  We do not have commissions data,
but we show that, on dual trading days, customers of dual traders in the S&P 500 futures receive
lower (higher) prices for buys (sells) compared to pure brokers.  Since we have already shown that
customers of dual traders do not have superior information, we interpret this result as evidence of
superior execution skills of dual traders in the S&P 500 futures.
Related to our research are studies which examine whether dual traders provide better
execution for their customers.  Results from these studies are mixed.  Fishman and Longstaff (1992)
find that they do, but Chang and Locke (1996) and the CFTC (1989) come to the opposite
conclusion.6  These studies, however, do not directly examine the possibility that customers may
receive better prices because they are better informed, and not because of dual traders’ superior
execution skills.  Fishman and Longstaff (1992) and Chang and Locke (1996) compare trading
profits of dual traders and locals to examine whether dual traders may have superior information,
6     
7Studies of dual trading featuring the bid-ask spread include the CFTC (1989), Walsh and Dinehart (1991),
Fishman and Longstaff (1992), Smith and Whaley (1994), and Chang and Locke (1996).
but such comparison cannot identify the source of the information (i.e., customers or dual traders
themselves).  Chang and Locke (1996) correlate the net trading volumes of dual traders and
customers, but they do not  correlate the directions of trades, nor do they distinguish between dual
traders’ own customers and other customers.  By directly testing for piggybacking by dual traders
on their own customers’ trades, we are able to say whether they are trading based on customers’
information. 
Other studies in this area focus on the liquidity effects of dual trading, although policy
makers are primarily concerned about the potential for trading abuse with dual trading.  The
evidence on liquidity is not compelling: the effect of dual trading on liquidity can be positive,
negative or neutral.7  
Our analysis is related to recent studies of Nasdaq market makers.  For example, Christie and
Huang (1994) and Barclay (1995) compare spreads quoted by market makers on Nasdaq and
competing exchanges.  However, as Demsetz (1997) points out, conclusions drawn from such
comparisons are complicated by the fact that these studies cannot distinguish between spreads set
by limit order traders and spreads set by market makers when trading for their own accounts.  We,
on the other hand, are able to distinguish between personal trades and customer trades, and thus
compare realized spreads on dual traders’ own trades and those of competing market makers (locals)
on the same exchange.
Another related literature deals with the relationship between market liquidity and stock
returns.  For example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) find a significant relation between
monthly stock returns and measures of market depth obtained from intraday data while Amihud and
7Mendelson (1986) find evidence that asset returns include a significant premium for the quoted
spread.  In contrast, we find that the price paid by futures customers includes a premium for the
realized spread of brokers, which in turn is related to brokers’ liquidity provision.
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 illustrates the theoretical
possibility of misallocation, derives the determinants of dual traders’ legitimate and misallocation
profits, and shows that, with a competitive market for brokerage services, some or all of brokers’
profits may be handed back to customers.  Section 2 tests for price differences between brokers’ own
trades and their customers’ trades.  Sections 3, 4 and 5 consider alternative explanations for the price
differences: liquidity supply, information-based trading by brokers, and greater effort by brokers for
their personal trading.  In section 6, we examine whether brokers’ profits are passed on to customers.
Section 7 concludes.
1.  Misallocation of Trades by Brokers: A Theoretical Discussion
In this section, we establish the theoretical possibility that dual traders may misallocate
customer trades, by reserving better trade prices for themselves.  We derive the determinants of
brokers’ legitimate profits from dual trading, and their profits from misallocation.  Finally, we show
that, if the brokerage services market is competitive, dual trading brokers may pass on some of their
trading profits to customers by providing them with better prices relative to pure brokers.
We consider a two period asset market structured along the lines of Kyle (1985).  There is a
single risky asset with random value v, drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
v. There is an informed trader who observes v and submits market orders.  Uninformed noise
traders place market orders u1 and u2, in periods one and two, respectively, where ut, for t = 1,2, is
8also normal with mean 0 and variance u.  All  random variables are independent of one another.
The informed customer and uninformed noise traders must trade through a broker who submits
customer orders to the market maker. By observing the informed order, the broker can infer v.  By
observing the orders of noise traders, he is aware of the size of uninformed trades. Thus, the broker
has an incentive to trade based on customer orders.  The broker is not allowed to trade ahead of (i.e.,
front run) customers. Initially, the broker is also not allowed to switch customer trades. 
In period one, the broker receives market orders from the informed trader and noise traders,
which he then submits to the market maker.  In period two, the broker trades for himself, along with
period two noise traders.  Each period, a market marker sets a price to earn zero expected profits,
conditional on the order flow history.
The model is solved by backward induction.  Given the period one choice x by the informed
trader and u1 by noise traders, the broker chooses personal trading quantity z in period two to
maximize conditional expected profits E[(v-p2)zx,u1,p1], where the conditioning is based on the
broker’s observation of informed and uninformed orders received, and the period one price.  The
period two price is p2 = 2y2+µ2y1 where yt is the period t net order flow, and y2 = z  + u2. 
The broker’s period two trading rule z(x,u1) only depends on x and u1, and not on the period
one price p1, since the latter does not contain any information additional to x and u1.  In period one,
the informed trader observes v and chooses x, assuming (correctly) that his order will be executed
in the first period.  Accordingly, the informed trader chooses x to maximize conditional expected
profits E[(v-p1)xv] ,where the period one price is p1 = 1y1, and the period one net order flow is y1
= x+u1.   Proposition 1 below solves for the unique linear equilibrium in this market. 
Proposition 1: In the unique linear equilibrium, the informed trader trades x =Av in period
one, and the price is p1 = 1y1.  In period two, the broker trades z = B1x + B2u1, where the price
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is p2 = 2y2 + µ2y1, and: 
Proof: See appendix.
The period one solution is identical to Kyle's (1985) single period equilibrium. Thus, the
informed trade is unaffected by brokers' trading in period two since it is executed only in period one.
In period two, the dual trader piggybacks on period one informed trades (B1>0) and offsets period
one noise trades (B2<0).
A.  Misallocation by Dual Traders
To illustrate the possibility of misallocation, suppose the period one and period two trades
occur close together in time and the broker does not report trades to customers before observing the
period two price.  It is clear from Proposition 1 that trades executed by the dual trader for customers
and his own account can occur at different prices (i.e., p1  p2), even when these trades occur close
together in time.  From (2) and (5):
10
     
8If the informed trader has a prior probability assessment regarding the likelihood of misallocation, he might
take this into account when formulating his trading strategy.  As long as misallocation does not occur with probability
one, however, the logic of our simple model should remain valid in a more complex setup where the informed trader
anticipates the possiblity of the broker’s misallocation.
     
9Floor traders try to infer whether another floor trader trades for a customer or his own account by observing
the latter's clearing members.  If a single clearing member receives most of the trades, then it is likely that the floor
trader trades for his own account. If several different clearing members receive trades, then the floor trader is likely to
be an independent broker.
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The dual trader can profit by claiming the trade which receives the better price as his own.
For example, consider the case where all customers and the dual trader purchase the asset and so
p2>p1.  Then, the dual trader has an incentive to claim a customer’s purchase at p1 as his own, and
allocate his own purchase at p2 to the customer.8  
From (6), the incentive to misallocate is higher, the greater is the price difference (p2-p1).
Below we describe two scenarios likely to cause a large price change from one trade to another.
Scenario 1 (Market volatility).  From (6), the price change (p2 - p1) is decreasing in the noise
volatility u and increasing in the asset volatility v.  Thus, in times of high volatility, or when the
size of noise trades is low, misallocation is more likely.
Scenario 2 (Market uncertainty).  In the futures pit, it is never known for sure whether a particular
floor broker is a dual trader or a pure broker.9  This uncertainty on the part of the market maker may
increase price uncertainty and provide dual traders increased opportunity to misallocate customer
trades.  To illustrate this argument, suppose the market maker does not know for sure whether the
period two trade is by an informed customer or a dual trader.  Let d(y2) be the market maker’s
probability that the period two trade is by a dual trader, conditional on observing the net order flow
11
     
10An example of such an updating rule can be found in the dual trading model of Fishman and Longstaff
(1992).
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  Let [1-d(y2)] be the market maker’s belief  that the period two order flow is y2 = x2m + u2, where
x2m is an order from another informed trader, different from the dual trader and from the period one
informed trader, and who has also observed v.
Given this belief, and after observing y2, the market maker sets a price p2m = p1 + 2my2 with
probability [1-d(y2)].  We can easily calculate p2m since this price is equivalent to the Kyle (1985)
single period price.  Thus, with probability [1-d(y2)], the price change from period one to period two
(details in appendix) is:
With probablity d(y2), the market makers sets a price p2 .  From Proposition 1, p2 = p1 +2
y2, where 2 is given by (5).  Thus, the expected price change in period two is:
The second inequality follows if d(y2)>0 because, from (7), 2m > 2.  Thus, uncertainty on
the part of the market maker as to the likelihood of dual trading can induce large price changes, and
create a positive incentive for misallocation. 
B.  Brokers’ Legitimate Trading Profits and Profits from Misallocation. 
Dual traders can make profits legitimately through piggybacking on customer trades, as
shown in Proposition 1. To distinguish between such legitimate profits and profits from
misallocation, we analyze the determinants of the dual trader’s profits from these two sources. 
Proposition 2.  1) Brokers’ realized trading profits per contract are decreasing in the market
12
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price impact.
 2) Brokers’ realized profits per contract from misallocation are increasing in
the market price impact.
Proof: Let W denote the dual trader’s realized piggybacking profits per contract.  Let D denote the
dual trader’s realized misallocation profits per contract.
Since t, t = 1,2,  is the price impact of a unit of order flow, W is decreasing in the period
one price impact 1 and the period two market price impact 2, while D is increasing in the period
two market price impact.  The result is intuitive: when piggybacking, the dual trader is like an
informed trader and profits when prices do not respond much to their trades (market depth is high).
When misallocating customer trades, his profits are potentially higher when successive price
changes are higher (market depth is low).
C.  Misallocation and Customer Welfare
Since trading is a zero-sum game (the market maker makes zero expected profits on
average), if dual trader's profits from misallocation exceed their legitimate profits, the excess profits
are at the expense of customers.  However, customers may not be hurt if the profits are returned to
them in the form of lower commissions, or price discounts.
Proposition 3.  If the market for brokerage services is competitive, then customers of dual
traders receive a larger price discount and/or lower commissions relative to what they would
receive from a pure broker. 
Proof:  Suppose the dual trader charges a fee of $c per customer trade, and this is independent of
13
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the order size.  Following Fishman and Longstaff (1992), we assume that the broker faces a variable
cost k1 per customer trade, with k1>0.   We also assume that the brokerage business is competitive
and so the broker chooses c to break even on each trade.
We analyze the determination of c from the informed trader’s point of view.  In period zero,
the broker chooses the fee c to charge each customer.  Then, the informed trader observes v and
chooses x to maximize conditional expected net profits E[(v-p1)xv] - c.  To avoid technical
problems related to non-trading, we assume that c is small enough that equilibrium net profits are
always positive.  The precise condition is that c satisfies: 
Let M be the broker’s profits from misallocation, per customer trade.  The broker’s zero
profits condition implies that, for each customer trade:
  Let cn be the fee charged by a pure execution broker (i.e., a broker who does not trade for
his own account).  Analogous to (11), we have:
From (11) and (12), if M>0, then c<cn.  This result was previously shown in Fishman and Longstaff
(1992) and Sarkar (1995).
Alternatively, the dual trading broker may provide a price discount to customers.  Let Pd be
the trade price charged to the customer by the dual trader, and let  represent the fraction of profits
M that the dual trader wants to pass on to the customer in the form of a price discount.  Since the
dual trader must pay Pd to the market maker, we can rewrite (11) as follows:
14
     
11We choose 1987 because we wish to control for the effect on dual traders' behavior of Chicago Mercantile
Exchange regulations, such as the Top Step rule of June 21, 1987 (reserving the use of the top step of the pit to pure
brokers in the S&P 500 futures market) and the banning of dual trading in "mature liquid" contracts in 1991 (which
affected the Japanese yen futures, among others).
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In (13), the broker makes up the price discount by charging higher commissions (M+c).
 Let Pb be the price charged and B be the price discount given by the pure execution broker.
Analogous to (13), we have:
Equating (13) and (14):
Assume that the dual trader charges the same "effective" commission as the pure broker: M
+ c =  B + cn.  Then, from (15), M - B = M > 0: the dual trading broker provides a price discount
larger than the pure broker by an amount equal to the misallocation profits per customer trade.
In the remainder of this paper, we study empirically whether dual traders receive more
favorable prices than their customers, whether this is due to misallocation, and whether dual traders
compensate their customers fully or partially by sharing any profits from misallocating trades.
2.  An Empirical Analysis of Brokers’ Misallocation
We use the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's Computerized Trade Reconstruction (CTR) data
for the S&P 500 index futures and the Japanese yen futures during fifteen randomly selected days
for the period May 1 to June 13, 1987.11 The data provide for each trade, the customer type, the trade
type, the number of contracts traded, the trade price, and a buy-sell indicator with all variables dated
15
     
12The other indicators are Customer Type Indicator 2 (trades executed for a clearing member's house account)
and Customer Type Indicator 3 (trades for another member present on the exchange floor). 
     
13The 2 percent filter is used to allow for the possibility of error trading. As Chang, Locke, and Mann (1994)
state, "when a broker makes a mistake in executing a customer order, the trade is placed into an error account as a trade
for the brokers personal account. The broker may then offset the error with a trade for the error account. A value of
2 percent for this error trading seems reasonable from conversations with Commodity Futures Trading Commission
and exchange staff."
at thirty minute brackets or intervals. The customer type is classified by four indicators. We focus
on trades indicated by Customer Type Indicator 1 (trades executed for floor traders' own accounts)
and Customer Type Indicator 4 (trades for outside customers), which are relevant for dual trading.12
The majority of trades fall under these two categories.
The S&P 500 sample contains 412,441 trades and 794 traders active during the fifteen
sample days, with a daily average volume of more than 94,000 contracts. Our Japanese yen sample
contains 56,006 trades and 251 traders, with a daily average trading volume of almost 20,000
contracts.
A.  The Dual and Nondual Trading Samples
The following method is used to construct the dual trading and nondual trading samples.  Let
xit = (personal trading volume)/(total trading volume) for trader i on day t.  Depending on the value
of xit, we define day t as a dual day, a local day, or a broker day for trader i in the following way.
Day t is a dual day for floor trader i if 0.02 xit 0.98,13 a local day if 0.98< xit 1, and a broker day
if 0 xit < 0.02.  We define a dual trader as a floor trader with at least one dual day in the sample
period. Thus, the dual trader sample consists of the dual days, local days, and broker days of dual
traders. A local (broker) is a floor trader who trades exclusively for his own (customer's) account
for every day he is active. Thus, the local (broker) sample consists exclusively of local (broker) days
16
     
14We pay a small price for the advantages of our way of defining floor traders.   Specifically, we are forced to
omit a few floor traders who trade as locals on some days and as pure brokers on other days since they do not fit into
any of our categories. There were thirteen such traders in the S&P 500 futures sample and six traders in the Japanese
yen futures sample, and they accounted for a minor proportion of trading activity.
     
15The number of active floor traders is calculated by dividing the number of trader days by 15, the number
of days in sample for each type of trader.
of locals (brokers).
Alternatively, one may categorize a floor trader i on a daily basis according to the value of
xit.  This alternative definition focuses on the activity of a particular trader since, by this definition,
a floor trader may (for example) be a dual trader one day, and a local on a different day.  By our
definition, in contrast, a floor trader is either a dual trader, or a local, but never both.  Our definition
separates the functions of a dual trader (i.e., brokering, personal trading, and dual trading) and thus
provides a way to test whether the behavior pattern of a dual trader is associated specifically with
dual trading.  For example, if dual trader i is consistently misallocating customer trades to his own
account, we can check whether the bid-ask spread on his personal trades is "excessive" only on his
dual trading days.14 
B.  Activity Level of Dual Traders 
Table 2 provides information on the activities of dual and nondual floor traders.  Of all floor
traders, dual traders are the most active.  For the S&P 500 futures, 212 out of 794 floor traders are
dual traders.  Of the number of active floor traders per day,15 however, 121 of 357 active floor
traders on a given day are dual traders.  Similarly, while the average trader is active for almost seven
17
     
16This number is calculated by dividing the number of trader days by the number of traders.  These numbers
understate the activity level of the median trader because many traders were active for just one or two days during our
sample period.
days,16 the average dual trader is active for almost nine days.  For the Japanese yen futures, 52 of
251 floor traders are dual traders.  But, 35 of 93 active traders per day are dual traders, and the
average dual trader has 10 active days, compared to 5.5 days for the average trader. 
Table 3 provides information on trading frequency and volume during dual and nondual
trading days of floor traders.  The main finding here is that trading frequency is three-to-four times
higher and average volume is about two times higher on dual trading days, compared to nondual
trading days.  For example, in the S&P 500 futures, the number of trades per trader day is 153 on
dual trading days, compared to 56 on broker days and 54 on local days.  Volume per trader day is
554 on dual trading days, compared to 290 on broker days and 157 on local days. 
The high level of trading activity by dual traders suggests that there were ample opportunities
for dual traders to misallocate customer trades.  Equally, the data may indicate that dual traders were
active liquidity providers to the market. 
C.  Misallocation by Dual Traders
To test whether dual traders receive more favorable prices than their customers, we compute
for each trading bracket, and for buys and sales separately, the average volume weighted price of
dual traders customer trades and personal trades on dual trading days.  For trading bracket j, let Pj4B
and Pj4S be the prices for purchases and sales, respectively, executed by dual traders for their
customers.  Similarly, Pj1B and Pj1S are the prices for purchases and sales by dual traders for their
own accounts in bracket j.  The null hypothesis is (P1B -P4B) = 0 and (P1S -P4S)=0, where (P1B -P4B)
18
     
17To obtain the cash equivalent value in dollars for the S&P 500 futures, we multiply the price, which is quoted
in dollars per index point, by 500.   For the Yen futures, which is quoted in dollars per 100 yens, we multiply the price
by 125,000 yens.
is the mean value of (Pj1B -Pj4B), and (P1S -P4S) is the mean value of (Pj1S -Pj4S).  The test statistic is
the paired t, found by calculating the mean and standard deviations of the difference series (Pj1B -
Pj4B) and (Pj1S -Pj4S).  Note that our unit of observation is a trading bracket, giving us 210
observations for the S&P 500 contract and 154 observations for the Yen contract.
Table 4 provides evidence consistent with misallocation of customer trades by dual traders.
For both contracts, dual traders on average receive more favorable prices when trading for their own
accounts than when trading for customers.  They buy at a lower price and sell at a higher price than
their customers, and these differences are significant.  For example, in the S&P 500 futures, dual
traders on average sell a contract for their own account at an average price of 291.0927, but sell for
their customers at an average price of 290.9985.  The difference of 0.0942, or a cash equivalent of
$47.10 per contract,17 is significant at the 1 percent level.  For the Yen futures, the price differences
are lower in magnitude, but still significant at the 2.5 percent level.
3.  Are Price Differences Due to Brokers’ Compensation for Supplying
Liquidity?
There are three alternative explanations for the price differences found earlier.  First, dual
traders when trading for their own accounts act like market makers, quoting bid and ask prices, and
interacting with the public order flow.  Thus, the price difference may measure the compensation
to dual traders for providing market making services.  Second, dual traders, by virtue of observing
customers’ order flow, may have better knowledge of supply and demand conditions in the market.
19
     
18We are grateful to James Moser for this suggestion.
This allows them to trade at opportune times.  Finally, dual traders may try harder to search for a
better price when trading for themselves.18  In this section, we examine the first alternative
explanation for the price difference.
To test whether dual traders are compensated for market making skills, we compare the
average bid-ask spread for dual traders’ own trades with locals’ trades.  Locals’ trading strategies
closely resemble those of market makers.  For example, Silber (1984) and Smidt (1985) argue that
locals provide “immediacy”, or immediate liquidity, by trading frequently and in small amounts.
Thus, if dual brokers trade mainly as market makers, the average bid-ask spread on their trades
should, on average, be similar to those on locals’ trades.  On the other hand, if dual traders are
misallocating customer trades, the average bid-ask spread on their personal trades should be
"excessive"---i.e., higher than the average bid-ask spread on locals’ trades.
We proceed as follows.  For each trading bracket, and for buys and sales separately, we
calculate the average volume weighted price of locals’ trades and dual traders personal trades.  For
bracket j,  Pj1B and Pj1S are the prices for purchases and sales, respectively, by dual traders for their
own accounts.  Similarly, PjLB and PjLS are the prices for purchases and sales, respectively, executed
by locals in bracket j.  The null hypothesis is (P1S -P1B ) - (PLS -PLB)=0, where (P1S -P1B ) is the mean
value of (Pj1S -Pj1B), and (PLS -PLB) is the mean value of (PjLS -PjLB).  The test statistic is the paired t,
calculated from the mean and standard deviation of the spread differences [(Pj1S -Pj1B) - (PjLS -PjLB)].
The comparison is carried out for dual days of dual traders (i.e., days when they trade both for
20
     
19We also tested for differences in spreads for local days--i.e, days when dual traders traded exclusively for
themselves.  Since the results do not differ, we report results for dual days only.
     
20For the S&P 500, the minimum tick is $25 and, for the Yen, the minimum tick is $12.50.  On the basis of
prior research and market knowledge, we expect the bid-ask spread per contract to be, approximately, of the same order
of magnitude as the minimum price change for the contract. 
customers and for their own accounts).19
Table 5 shows that, for both contracts, there is no statistically significant difference between
the mean bid-ask spreads of dual traders and locals.  For example, in the S&P 500 futures, the mean
bid-ask spread for dual traders is 0.0852 (or, $42.60) per contract compared to 0.0888 (or, $44.40)
per contract for locals, but this difference is not statistically significant.   This is consistent with the
null hypothesis that the price difference is compensation for liquidity supplied by dual traders. 
However, the sign and magnitude of the mean spreads are not always economically
meaningful.   For example, the bid-ask spread has a negative value for the Yen futures, and the
dollar value of the bid-ask spread is approximately twice the exchange-mandated minimum tick, or
price change, for both contracts.20  Therefore, we also compare the median revenues per contract for
personal trades of locals and dual traders, using the Wilcoxon difference in medians test.  Per
contract revenues are the realized differences between the average sell and buy prices received by
floor traders, and thus another measure of realized bid-ask spreads.  They are calculated on a daily
basis by subtracting the value of purchases from the value of sales for each trader, with imbalances
valued at the daily settlement prices (marked-to-market) of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
Aggregate daily revenues are divided by the number of round-trip transactions for each floor trader
to obtain daily revenues per contract.  As before, the comparison is carried out for both local and
dual days of dual traders.
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Table 6 reports the results on personal trading revenues (in dollars) of dual traders and locals.
Consistent with Table 5, mean revenues are either negative or have economically unrealistic
magnitudes for both contracts.  However, median revenues are always positive and have
economically sensible values.  In addition, the distribution of revenues exhibits negative and positive
skewness (not reported), varying between -0.48 and 0.5.   For the S&P 500 futures, dual traders have
significantly higher median personal trading revenues per contract on their dual days compared to
locals.  On local days, however, personal trading revenues per contract of dual traders and locals are
not significantly different.  For the Japanese yen futures, there is no significant difference between
dual traders' and locals' median revenues per contract on either dual days or local days. 
These results show that, for the Yen futures, the bid-ask spread on dual traders’ personal
trades is not excessive compared to that of competing market makers.  However, for the S&P 500
futures, there is some evidence that the median spread on dual traders’ personal trades is too high
relative to competing market makers.  In the next section, we examine whether the additional spread
enjoyed by dual traders is due to superior information obtained from their customers.
4.  Are Price Differences due to Brokers’ Superior Information?
In this section, we test the validity of the second alternative explanation for brokers’ price
advantage---namely, whether dual traders, by virtue of observing customers’ order flow, benefit
from their customers’ superior information.  This may explain the  results of Table 6 for the S&P
500 futures, showing the profitability of dual traders’ personal trades on their dual trading days.
Dual traders may legitimately profit from their customers’ information by piggybacking on
22
     
21This definition of market price impact is consistent with Kyle (1985), where it is denoted .  Kyle (1985)
shows that >0 in equilibrium.
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customer trades.   Proposition 2 suggests a way to distinguish between dual traders’ legitimate
profits and profits from misallocation.  Specifically, piggybacking profits per contract should be
negatively related to the market price impact, whereas misallocation profits per contract should be
positively related to the market price impact.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following regression using the Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) method.
where, for day t,  Pt is dual traders’ personal trading revenues (in dollars) per contract on their dual
trading days, LVt is log of customer trading volume, VOLt is a proxy for volatility,  Mt is the number
of market makers, PIMPt is a proxy for the market price impact (in dollars), and the dummy variable
Dt is equal to 1 for the S&P 500 futures and 0 otherwise.  Volatility is measured by the standard
deviation of prices for purchases only (to control for the bid-ask bounce).  The number of market
makers is approximated by the number of floor traders trading for their own account on each day.
PIMPt is calculated as follows.  For each bracket, we divide the price change (the difference
between the prices of the first and last trades) by the signed customer volume to obtain the price
impact for that bracket, and then average across all brackets for the day to obtain the average daily
market price impact. To be economically meaningful, PIMPt should be positive for every t, which
is the case in our sample.21  Note that, in contrast to Table 6, revenues are calculated on a sample
day basis, rather on a trader day basis.  In other words, to obtain Pt, we calculate revenues for day
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t for each dual trader as before and then average over all dual traders active on day t.  This is
necessary since our right-hand side variables are defined on a sample day basis.
The dummy variable Dt controls for contract-specific effects.  The coefficient estimates for
the Yen futures are given by ai, i = 0,1,2,3,4, and for the S&P 500 futures are given by (ai+bi).  We
use the F statistic to test the joint hypotheses b0 = b1 = b2 = b3 = b4 = 0. 
The key parameters are a4 and b4.  Whereas negative values of a4 and (a4+b4) indicate that
brokers’ profits may be due to information, positive values of a4 and (a4+b4) are consistent with
misallocation as a source of brokers’ profits.  a1 and (a1+b1) can be positive or negative.  On days
with high customer trading volume, brokers may be too busy executing customer trades and earning
commissions to trade profitably on their own accounts, and so a1<0 and (a1+b1)< 0.  Conversely,
days with frequent trading by customers may provide extra opportunities for piggybacking or
misallocating trades, and so a1>0 and (a1+b1)> 0.  a2 > 0 and (a2+b2) > 0 if dual traders anticipate
volatility and thus widen the spread to protect themselves.  a2 < 0 and (a2+b2) < 0 if dual traders are
surprised by volatility.  An increase in the number of market makers should reduce trading profits,
implying a3 < 0 and (a3+b3)< 0.
Table 7 presents the results.  a4 and b4 are both positive and significant, consistent with the
hypothesis that, for both contracts, brokers’ profits are from misallocating trades, and not from
superior information.  If buying (selling) one contract increases (decreases) the price by one dollar,
then revenues per contract increases 5 cents for the Yen futures, and 17 cents for the S&P 500
futures.  b3 is negative and significant, and (a3 + b3) < 0, indicating that an increase in the number
of market makers decreases brokers’ revenues for the S&P 500 contract.  b1 is positive and
significant, and (a1 + b1) > 0, indicating that commission income and trading profits may be
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complements for the S&P 500.   The coefficient of volatility is not significant, consistent with the
results of Locke and Sarkar (1996). 
To further check the robustness of the results of Table 7, we test for piggybacking behavior
by dual traders.  Proposition 1 predicts that, if a dual trader’s customers are informed, he will trade
in the same direction as his customers, whereas if they are uninformed, he will trade in the opposite
direction to his customers.
We assign the number +1 to a trading bracket if dual trader i is a net buyer for his personal
account in that bracket, and the number -1 if he is a net seller for his personal account. We do a
similar assignation to trades executed by dual trader i for his own customers. For dual trader i, Rio
is the rank correlation between these two series of numbers.  We also check whether those who are
not
 
dual trader i’s customers are net buyers or sellers in trading bracket j and assign numbers +1or
-1, accordingly.  For dual trader i, Rin is the rank correlation between the direction of his own trades
and that of customers not his own.  Let Ro and Rn be the mean values of Rio and Rin, respectively.
If dual traders’ customers are informed, then Ro > 0.  If Rn is also positive, we further require that
(Ro - Rn) > 0. If dual traders’ customers are not informed, then Ro<0.  The null hypothesis is (Ro - Rn)
= 0, where (Ro - Rn) is the mean value of (Rio - Rin).
Table 8 shows that, for the S&P 500 futures, Ro<0.  Although Rn is also negative, (Ro - Rn) <
0, and this is statistically significant at the one percent level.  This result indicates that dual traders’
customers in the S&P 500 futures may be uninformed.  For the Yen futures, Ro > 0 and Rn < 0, but
the difference (Ro - Rn) is not statistically different from zero.  These results are consistent with those
in Table 7, indicating either that dual traders’ customers are not informed or, if they are, dual traders
do not take advantage of that information.
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5.  Do Brokers Make Additional Efforts For Their Own Trades?
In this section, we examine whether brokers’ price  advantage is due to greater effort by dual
traders when trading for themselves.  Grossman (1989) argues that dual traders’ personal and
customer trades are substitutes.  When the market is active, dual traders engage in brokerage. When
the market is slack, they trade for themselves.  Thus, during a market slack, dual traders may have
more time to search for better prices when making their own trades.
The above argument implies that there may be a negative relation between dual traders’ own
activities and those of the market.  The results of Table 7 do not support this contention, since dual
traders’ revenues and customer trading volume are positively related for the S&P 500 futures ((a1
+ b1) > 0) and unrelated for the Yen futures.  As a further test, we compute, for each dual trader i
on his dual trading day, and for each trading bracket, the correlation between the number of trades
for his own accounts and the number of trades for all customers (both his own customers and those
of other brokers).  Let Rim be the correlation for dual trader i, averaged over all brackets.  Let Rm be
the mean correlation for all dual traders.  Under the null hypothesis, Rm = 0.  If dual traders’ personal
and customer trading activities are substitutes, then Rm<0.
Table 9 shows the results.  For the S&P 500 futures, Rm is positive, but not significant.  For
the Yen futures, Rm<0 but not significantly different from zero.  These results provide little evidence
that dual traders expend greater efforts when making their personal trades, relative to when they
execute trades for customers.
6.  Do Brokers Share Profits With Customers?
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The results of Table 6 show that brokers’ trading is profitable.   Proposition 3 suggests the
possibility that dual traders may share some of the profits with customers by providing superior
execution.  We compute for each trading bracket, and for buys and sales separately, the average
volume weighted price of the customer trades of dual traders and pure brokers.  If dual traders
provide superior execution for customers compared to pure brokers, they should on average buy
(sell) for customers at lower (higher) prices relative to pure brokers.  Further, if dual traders’
customers receive better prices, this cannot be due to their superior information, since evidence from
Tables 7 and 8 have already ruled out this possibility. 
 Let PBB and PBS be the mean prices for purchases and sales, respectively, executed by pure
brokers for their customers. Similarly, P4B and P4S are the mean prices for purchases and sales,
respectively, by dual traders for their customers.  The null hypothesis is P4B - PBB = 0 and P4S - PBS
= 0.  Table 10 reports the results on execution skills of dual traders and pure brokers.  For the S&P
500 futures, dual traders’ customers buy at lower prices and sell at higher prices compared to
customers of pure brokers.  For example, customers of pure brokers pay 291.1438 to buy one S&P
500 futures contract, whereas customers of dual traders pay 291.115 for the same purchase.   The
difference of 0.0288, or a cash equivalent value of $14.40 per contract, is significant at the 2.5
percent level.  For the Japanese yen futures, the difference in prices paid by the two sets of
customers are the same is not significant.
Combining the results of Tables 4 and 10, dual traders appear to share some profits with
customers, at least in the S&P 500 futures.  For example, customers of dual traders pay $53.75 more
to buy one S&P 500 futures contract, compared to dual traders’ own trades, but $14.40 less than if
they had used a pure broker. 
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7. Conclusion
In the context of futures markets, we study whether brokers allocate more favorable trades to
their own accounts, and less favorable trades to their customers.  We find that, within a thirty minute
trading bracket, brokers on average buy at a lower price and sell at a higher price for their own
accounts relative to their customers.  We show evidence that this price advantage may be brokers’
compensation for providing liquidity when trading for their own accounts, but no evidence that they
are from superior information, or from extra effort when trading for themselves.  We find that
brokers who trade for themselves also provide superior execution to customers, relative to pure
brokers, suggesting that brokers may share trading profits (from whatever source) with customers.
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Table 1
Overview of Tests and Results 
Table
Number
Null hypothesis Test Result of test  
S&P 500
futures
Japanese
yen futures
I.  Misallocation of trades by dual traders
Four Dual traders do not
misallocate favorable trades
to their own accounts.
Compare average price paid
by dual traders on their own
trades, relative to their
customers’ trades.
Reject Reject
II.  Alternative explanations for brokers’ price advantage: liquidity supply
Five Price difference is 
compensation for liquidity
supplied by dual traders.
Compare mean bid-ask
spread on personal trades of
dual traders and locals.
Cannot
reject
Cannot
reject
Six Price difference is 
compensation for liquidity
supplied by dual traders.
Compare median personal
trading revenues per contract
of dual traders and locals.
Reject Cannot
reject
III.  Alternative explanations for brokers’ price advantage: brokers’ information advantage
Seven Dual traders’ revenues are
not from misallocation, or
from customers’ information. 
Regress dual trading profits
on the market price impact,
controlling for other factors.
Reject Reject
Eight Dual traders do not
piggyback on their informed
customers’ trades.
Correlate the direction of
dual traders’ own trades and
their customers’ trades.
Cannot
reject
Cannot
reject
IV.  Alternative explanations for brokers’ price advantage: increased effort by dual traders
Nine Dual traders do not expend
more effort on their personal
trades.
Correlate dual traders’
personal activity and market
activity.
Cannot
reject
Cannot
reject
V.  Are brokers’ profits passed on to customers?
Ten Dual traders do not provide
superior execution for
customers.
Compare customer trading
costs of dual traders and
pure brokers.
Reject Cannot
reject
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Table 2
Summary Statistics for the Activity of Floor Traders in the S&P 500 and Japanese
Yen Futures Pits
Own account refers only to floor traders who trade exclusively for their own account. Customer only denotes floor traders who trade
exclusively for their customers during the sample period. Both refers to floor traders who trade both for their own account and for their
customers on at least one day during the sample period. The sample period is 15 randomly selected days from May 1 to June 13, 1987,
for both contracts. 
S&P 500 Futures, 1987 Japanese Yen Futures, 1987
Locals Pure
Brokers
Dual
Traders
Total Locals Pure
Brokers
Dual
Traders
Total
Number of traders 467 115 212 794 120 79 52 251
Number of trading
days
3,162 389 1,809 5,360 576 299 521 1,396
For own account
only
3,162 357 3,519 576 113 689
For customer only 389 216 605 299 145 444
For both 1,236 1,236 263 263
Number of active days
per trader
6.77 3.38 8.53 6.75 4.8 3.78 10.02 5.56
For own account
only
6.77     1.68 4.43 4.8     2.17 2.75
For customer only 3.38 1.02 0.76     3.78 2.79 1.77
For both 5.83 1.56         5.06 1.05
Number of active
traders per day
210.8 25.93 120.6 357.33 38.4 19.93 34.73 93.07
For own account
only
210.8     23.8 234.6 38.4     7.53 45.93
For customer only 25.93 14.4 40.33     19.93 9.67 29.6
For both 82.4 82.4         17.53 17.53
32
Table 3
Trading Activity in the S&P 500 and Japanese Yen Futures Pits
Trading for own account (customers) refers to days on which a floor trader trade exclusively for its own (customers') account(s). Dual
trading refers to days on which a floor trader trade both for its own account and for its customers. The sample period is 15 randomly
selected days from May 1 to June 13, 1987,  for both contracts. 
Trading for customers Trading for own account Dual trading Total
                                                     S&P 500 Index Futures, 1987
Number of trader days 605 3,519 1,236 5,360
Number of trades 34,082 189,368 188,991 412,441
Trades per trader day 56.33 53.81 152.91 76.95
For own account 53.81 44.11 45.5
For customers 56.33 108.79 31.45
Total volume 175,390 552,103 684,545 1,412,038
Volume per trader day 289.90 156.89 553.84 263.44
For own account 156.89 179.47 144.39
For customers 289.90 374.37 119.05
Average trade size 5.15 2.92 3.62 3.42
For own account 2.92 4.07 3.17
For customers 5.15 3.44 3.79
                                                     Japanese Yen Futures, 1987
Number of trader days 444 689 263 1,396
Number of trades 9,875 22,194 23,937 56,006
Trades per trader day 22.24 32.21 91.02 40.12
For own account 32.21 34.1 22.32
For customers 22.24 56.92 17.8
Total volume 55,305 119,953 122,740 297,998
Volume per trader day 124.56 174.1 466.69 213.47
For own account 174.1 149.33 114.06
For customers 124.56 317.36 99.41
Average trade size 5.6 5.4 5.13 5.32
For own account 5.4 4.38 5.11
For customers 5.6 5.58 5.58
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Table 4
Misallocation of Customer Trades by Dual Traders
For each trading bracket j, we compute the average price (weighted by the trading volume) of purchases and sales by dual traders
for their own accounts (Pj1B and Pj1S, respectively) and for their customers’ accounts (Pj4B and Pj4S, respectively).  The null
hypothesis is (P1B -P4B) = 0 and (P1S -P4S)=0, where (P1B -P4B) is the mean value of (Pj1B -Pj4B), and (P1S -P4S) is the mean value of
(Pj1S -Pj4S).  S&P 500 prices are in dollars per index point.  Yen prices are in dollars per 100 yens.  Cash equivalent values, in
parentheses, are in dollars.  A  () indicates estimates which are significant at the 1 (2.5) percent level.  N is the number of
trading brackets.  The sample period is 15 randomly selected days from May 1 to June 13, 1987, for both contracts.
                                           S&P 500 Futures, 1987
Pj1B Pj4B Pj1S Pj4S
Mean 291.0075 291.115 291.0927 290.9985
Standard deviation 5.8332 5.8949 5.9034 5.8685
Minimum 277.9534 278.1255 278.002 278.0406
Maximum 302.9734 302.902 302.787 302.7248
Pj1B-Pj4B
Pj1S-Pj4S
   Mean = -0.1075 (-$53.75)         Standard deviation = 0.3388
    Mean =  0. 0942 ($47.10)       Standard deviation = 0.3165
Ho: P1B-P4B= 0
       P1S-P4S= 0
  Paired t = - 4.6        N =  210
 Paired t =   4.31       N = 209
                                        Japanese Yen Futures, 1987 
Mean 0.711293 0.711332 0.711053 0.711005
Standard deviation 0.0084519 0.0084522 0.008698 0.008696
Minimum 0.6925 0.6928 0.6928 0.692586
Maximum 0.72527 0.7253 0.72515 0.72522
Pj1B-Pj4B
Pj1S-Pj4S
Mean = -0.000039 (-$4.90)     Standard deviation = 0.000219
Mean =  0.000048 ($6)           Standard deviation = 0.000297
Ho: P1B-P4B= 0
       P1S-P4S= 0
   Paired t = -2.188               N = 152
  Paired t   =   1.999              N = 154
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Table 5
Bid-ask Spreads on Personal Trades of Dual Traders and Locals
For each trading bracket j, we compute the average price (weighted by the trading volume) of purchases and sales by dual traders
for their own accounts (Pj1B and Pj1S, respectively) and by locals (PjLB and PjLS, respectively).  The null hypothesis is (P1S -P1B ) -
(PLS -PLB)=0, where (P1S -P1B ) is the mean value of (Pj1S -Pj1B), and (PLS -PLB) is the mean value of (PjLS -PjLB).  S&P 500 prices are
in dollars per index point.  Yen prices are in dollars per 100 yens.  Cash equivalent values, in parentheses, are in dollars.  N is the
number of trading brackets.  The sample period is 15 randomly selected days from May 1 to June 13, 1987, for both contracts.
                                           S&P 500 Futures, 1987
Pj1B PjLB Pj1S PjLS
Mean 291.0075 291.0138 291.0927 291.1026
Standard deviation 5.8332 5.2649 5.9034 5.8385
Minimum 277.9534 277.5084 278.002 278.0646
Maximum 302.9734 302.5426 302.787 302.824
Pj1S-Pj1B = 0.0852 ($42.60)                                             PjLS-PjLB = 0.0888 ($44.40)
Ho: (P1S-P1B) - (PLS-PLB)=0
Mean = -0.0036 ($1.80)        Standard deviation = 0.09458
Paired  t =-0.5503                                   N=209
                                        Japanese Yen Futures, 1987 
Mean 0.711293 0.711301 0.711053 0.71104
Standard deviation 0.0084519 0.00861 0.008698 0.0086
Minimum 0.6925 0.6924 0.6928 0.6926
Maximum 0.72527 0.7252 0.72515 0.7253
Pj1S-Pj1B = -0.00024 ($30)                                      PjLS-PjLB = -0.000261 ($32.63)
Ho: (P1S-P1B) - (PLS-PLB) = 0
Mean = 0.000021($2.63)   Standard deviation = 0.00058
Paired t = 0.4464                        N = 152
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Table 6
Personal Trading Revenues Per Contract of Dual Traders and Locals
Local days refer to trading revenues per contract for days on which the floor trader trades only for its own account. Dual days refer
to trading revenues per contract for days on which the floor trader trades both for its own account and for its customers.  Revenues
are measured in dollars. The z-statistic tests whether the median personal trading revenues of dual traders and locals are the same.
P-values are given in parentheses.  A  indicates estimates which are significant at the 2.5 percent level.  N is the number of trader
days.  The sample period is 15 randomly selected days from May 1 to June 13, 1987, for both contracts. 
                                                S&P 500 Index Futures, 1987
Local Days of
Locals
Local Days of Dual
Traders
Dual Days of
Dual Traders
Mean revenue 29.15 19.57 38.60
Standard deviation 410.3 616.6 368.55
Minimum -3387.5 -3565 -2615.9
First quartile -6 -8.9 -18.65
Median 21.45 21.55 29.75
Third quartile 58.35 51.45 97.2
Maximum 3420 3712.5 2751.25
Difference in medians:
duals minus locals 
0.10 8.30
Z-statistic
(p-value)
0.7852
(0.4)
3.031
(0.0024)
N 2975 316 1206
                                                 Japanese Yen Futures, 1987
Mean revenue 22.375 -20 25
Standard deviation 455.875 589.5 286
Minimum -1933.75 -1783.75 -1255
First quartile -63.75 -18 -52.5
Median 11 6.125 10.875
Third quartile 136.25 190.875 57.125
Maximum 1895.25 1986.375 1460
Difference in medians:
duals minus locals 
-4.875 -0.125
Z-statistic
(p-value)
-1.137
(0.3)
-0.677
(0.5)
N 474 102 247
Table 7
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Determinants of Dual Trading Revenues
The determinants of dual trading revenues are estimated from the following regression:
where, for day t, Pt is dual traders’ revenues per contract in dollars, LVt  is the log of customer trading volume, VOLt is the standard
deviation of buy prices for customer trades, Mt  is the number of floor traders trading for their own account, PIMPt  is the market price
impact in dollars, and Dt=1 if the contract is the S&P 500 index futures, and 0 otherwise.  The F statistic tests the null hypotheses
b0=b1=b2=b3=b4=0.   T-statistics and p values  are shown in parentheses.  A  indicates estimates which are significant at the 5 percent
level, or below.  N  is the number of observations.   The sample period is 15 randomly selected days from May 1 to June 13, 1987 for
both contracts.
a

a

a

a

a

698.36
(1.385)
p=0.181
-78.30
(-1.398)
p=0.177
-0.12
(-1.12)
p=0.276
0.17
(0.691)
p=0.498
0.05
(2.712)
p=0.013
 b

b

b

b

b

-1748.21 
(-2.189)
p=0.041
177.41
(2.188)
p=0.041
-0.21
(-0.658)
p=0.518
-0.179
(-0.172)
p=0.485
0.115
(2.662)
p=0.015
N=29  Adjusted R2=0.54
H0: b0=b1=b2=b3=b4=0                F = 3.6175            Prob > F = 0.0171
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Table 8
Piggybacking by Dual Traders 
For trading bracket j, we compute whether dual trader i is a net buyer or seller for his (1) personal account, and (2) own customers.
We also compute whether those who are not dual trader i’s customers are net buyers or sellers in trading bracket j.  In all three cases,
we assign the number +1 (-1) to a trading bracket with positive net buys (sells).  For dual trader i, Rio is the mean rank correlation
between the direction of his trades and that of his own customers’ trades, while Rin is the rank correlation between the direction of his
trades and that of customers not his own.  The null hypothesis is (Ro - Rn) = 0, where (Ro - Rn) is the mean value of (Rio - Rin).  A 
indicates estimates which are significant at the 1 percent level.  N is the number of dual traders.  The sample period is 15 randomly
selected days from May 1 to June 13, 1987, for both contracts.
                                           S&P 500 Futures, 1987
Rio Rin
Mean -0.114 -0.001
Standard deviation 0.319 0.358
Minimum -1 -1
Maximum +1 +1
R
 io-R in
 
Mean = -0.104
 Standard deviation = 0.455
Ho: (R o-R n) = 0 Paired t = -2.98   N = 169
Japanese Yen Futures, 1987
Mean 0.019 -0.0369
Standard deviation 0.465 0.411
Minimum -1 -1
Maximum +1 +1
Rio-Rin
 
Mean =  0.022
 Standard deviation = 0.5122
Ho: (R o-R n) = 0 Paired t = 0.25   N = 34
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Table 9
Dual Traders’ Personal Trading Activity and Market Activity
We compute, for each dual trader i on his dual trading day, and each trading bracket, the correlation between the number of trades
for his own accounts and the number of trades for all customers.  Rim be the correlation for dual trader i, averaged over all brackets.
Rm is the mean correlation for all dual traders.  Under the null hypothesis Rm=0.  N indicates the number of dual traders.  The sample
period is 15 randomly selected days from May 1 to June 13, 1987, for both contracts.
S&P 500 Futures, 1987
Rim
Mean  0.0268
Standard deviation 0.3424
Minimum -0.9707
Maximum 0.9594
Ho: R m = 0 t = 0.112   N = 202
Japanese Yen Futures, 1987
Mean -0.1976
Standard deviation 0.4275
Minimum -1
Maximum +1
Ho: R m = 0 t = -0.3101   N = 45
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Table 10
Execution of Customer Trades by Dual Traders and Pure Brokers
For each trading bracket j, we compute the average price (weighted by the trading volume) of purchases and sales by dual traders for
their customers (Pj4B and Pj4S, respectively) and by pure brokers (PjBB and PjBS, respectively).  The null hypothesis is (P4B - PBB)=0 and
(P4S -PBS)=0, where (P4B - PBB) is the mean value of (Pj4B - PjBB), and (P4S -PBS) is the mean value of (Pj4S -PjBS)  S&P 500 prices are in
dollars per index point.  Yen prices are in dollars per 100 yens.  Cash equivalent values, in parentheses, are in dollars.  A  ()
indicates estimates which are significant at the 1 (2.5) percent level.   N is the number of trading brackets.   The sample period is 15
randomly selected days from May 1 to June 13, 1987, for both contracts.
                                           S&P 500 Futures, 1987
PjBB Pj4B PjBS Pj4S
Mean 291.1438 291.115 290.941 290.9985
Standard deviation 5.8847 5.8949 5.9032 5.8685
Minimum 278.1108 278.1255 278.0294 278.0406
Maximum 302.8013 302.902 302.5008 302.7248
Pj4B-PjBB
Pj4S-PjBS
   Mean = -0.0288 (-$14.40)   Standard deviation = 0.1860
    Mean =  0.0575 ($28.75)    Standard deviation = 0.2943
Ho: P4B-PBB= 0
       P4S-PBS= 0
  Paired t = -2.2438    N  = 210
   Paired t =  2.8246    N = 209
                                        Japanese Yen Futures, 1987 
Mean 0.711343 0.711332 0.711024 0.711005
Standard deviation 0.008418 0.0084522 0.008653 0.008696
Minimum 0.6929 0.6928 0.6927 0.6926
Maximum 0.7253 0.7253 0.7252 0.72522
Pj4B-PjBB
Pj4S-PjBS
Mean = -0.000011 (-$1.38)  Standard deviation = 0.000765
   Mean =0.000019 ($2.38)   Standard deviation = 0.000549
Ho: P4B-PBB= 0
       P4S-PBS= 0
Paired t = -0.176    N = 152
Paired t = 0.430      N = 154
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In period one, the insider’s problem is identical to the single period equilibrium in Kyle
(1985).  Thus, in equilibrium, the insider’s trading intensity A and market depth l1 are as given in
(1) and (2) of the text.
In period two, the broker’s problem is to choose z to maximize conditional expected
profits E[(v-p2)z½x, u1, p1], where p2=m2y1 + l2y2, y1=x+u1, and y2=z+u2. Using the law of iterated
projections, it is easily shown that E[(v-p2)z½x, u1, p1] = E[(v-p2)z½x, u1].  Thus, the first order
condition for this problem is:
v z Av u- - - =2 02 2 2 1l m m (A1)
The second order condition is l2>0.  Solving for z from (A1), after substituting for A:
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z
v
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2
2 21
1 2
2
2
2
1l
l m
l
m
l
(A2)
Next, we solve for m2 and l2.  First, we show that, if cov(y1,y2)=0, then l1=m2.
( )
cov( , )y y v u1 2
2
1 2
1
2 2
1
2
2
4
=
-
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S
S (A3)
Substituting for l1 in (A3), and putting the right-hand-side (RHS) expression equal to zero, we
get l1=m2.  It is also clear from (A3) that, if l1=m2, then cov(y1, 2)=0.
Cov(y1,y2)=0 implies that l2=cov(v,y2)/var(y2).  After substituting l1 for m2, and writing
out this expression:
40
l
l
l
l
l
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
4
16 4
=
+ +
S
S S S
v
v u
u
(A4)
Solving for l2 from (A4), after substituting for l1, we derive (5) in the text.  Substituting for l2
and m2 in (A2), we get (3) and (4) in the text.
Finally, it is easy to check that, if l1, l2 and m2 are as given in (2) and (5), then
cov(y1,y2)=0. Alternatively, instead of assuming cov(y1,y2) = 0, we can solve for m2 and l2 directly
using the projection formulas m l2
01 22 02 12
11 22 12
2 2
02 11 01 12
11 22 12
2
=
-
-
=
-
-
S S S S
S S S
S S S S
S S S( ) ( )
and , where
S01=cov(v,y1), S02=cov(v,y2), S12=cov(y2,y1), S11=var(y1) and S22=var(y2).  Although the
calculation is somewhat involved, the same result obtains.
Proof of Scenario 2
In period two, the second insider’s problem is to choose x2m to maximize conditional
expected profits E[(v-p2m)x2m½v], where p2m = p1 + l2my2, y1=x+u1, and y2 = x2m+u2. Thus, the first
order condition for this problem is:
v x pm- - =2 02 2 1l (A5)
The second order condition is l2m>0.  Solving for l2m in the usual way:
 l2
2
m
v
u
=
S
S
(A6)
